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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case requires us to decide whether the district court 
properly denied prisoner Ramos's 28 U.S.C. S 2255 motion 
alleging that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient 
to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) in 
light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of that provision 
in United States v. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).1 We 
conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and we therefore 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Ramos was indicted and tried before a jury for conspiracy 
to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1); 
distribution in excess of 100 grams of cocaine, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. S 2; distribution in 
excess of 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. S 2; and using and carrying 
firearms during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. S 2. 
 
The evidence at trial showed that Ramos and his co- 
conspirators, including Roman Blanco and two men called 
"Chemono" and "Pappitto," participated in a conspiracy that 
sold drugs in a second-floor apartment at 227 South Queen 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Muscarello v. United States, 
1998 WL 292058 (Sup. Ct. June 8, 1998), which construed the term 
"carries" in 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1), is inapplicable here. 
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Street in York, Pennsylvania. Ramos and Blanco rented the 
third-floor apartment of the same building to store the 
drugs being sold in the apartment below. Two firearms, a 
sawed-off shotgun and a .357 magnum revolver, were also 
stored in the third-floor apartment. Only Ramos and Blanco 
had access to the third-floor apartment. 
 
At trial, two witnesses testified that at times they saw 
firearms in the second-floor apartment. Candida Valentin 
testified that she saw a firearm in that apartment on one 
occasion: 
 
       Q: When you went to the second floor apartment was 
       there ever any time when you saw any weapons? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Do you recall when that would have been? 
 
       A: No, it's been a long time. 
 
       Q: What do you remember about seeing the weapons 
       on the second floor? 
 
       A: Well, it was a weapon. 
 
       Q: A weapon. Can you describe it? 
 
       A: And it was a handgun and he told me he had 
       bought it and I wanted to see it out of curiosity, 
       "Tony," okay and he showed it to me. I had it in my 
       hands and "Johnnie" didn't like the idea of me 
       having it in my hands. He told him to take it away 
       from me. That was the only time I seen it. 
 
A64-65. 
 
The second witness, Albert Lee King, Jr., testified that he 
saw firearms in the second-floor apartment while 
purchasing drugs there. He stated that he saw weapons (a 
large caliber silver handgun and a sawed-off shotgun) lying 
on the table when he went to the apartment. He also 
testified that he saw a man called "Tony" pick up a gun and 
that a "tall fellow had a shotgun in his hand one time." 
 
Without objection, the district court instructed the jury 
in accordance with our court's interpretation of the 
concept of "use" under S 924(c)(1). See United States v. 
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Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 1989). The 
district court stated: 
 
        It may be that a person used a firearm during and in 
       relation to a drug trafficking crime if you find that the 
       circumstances surrounding the presence of a firearm 
       in a place where drugs are traded suggest that the 
       firearm was located so as to be quickly and easily 
       available for use during drug transactions. 
 
        The presence of a loaded firearm in a place where 
       drugs are possessed with an intent to distribute may 
       be sufficient to prove that a firearm was used during 
       and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 
 
        When I say that a firearm was used, I don't mean in 
       the sense of someone holding it and pointing it orfiring 
       it. It's whether the firearm was employed in any way to 
       assist in or facilitate a drug trafficking crime. 
 
A88. 
 
The jury convicted Ramos on all four counts, and he was 
sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 228 months 
(three concurrent terms of 168 months on the first three 
counts and a consecutive term of 60 months on the final 
count). He was also ordered to pay fines and special 
assessments. The conviction was affirmed by this court in 
an unpublished judgment order. United States v. Ramos, 
No. 93-7223 (3d Cir. 1993). Two years later, the Supreme 
Court held in Bailey that in order to be convicted under 18 
U.S.C. S 924(c)(1)2 a defendant must be shown to have 
actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the 
underlying offense. 116 S. Ct. at 508. 
 
In 1996, Ramos filed the pro se S 2255 motion that is the 
subject of this appeal. In his motion, Ramos argued that 
his counsel had been ineffective and that the evidence at 
trial was insufficient to support his conviction under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) states, in pertinent part: 
 
       Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
       trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, shall, in 
addition to 
       the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug 
       trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years . . 
. 
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Bailey. The district court disagreed and denied his motion. 
Although the district court concluded that Valentin's 
testimony was insufficient to support Ramos's conviction 
under S 924(c)(1),3 the court held that King's testimony was 
sufficient even under the Bailey "use" standard. Ramos 
appealed, and we granted a certificate of appealability 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2253(a) limited to the S 924(c)(1) 
issue. 
 
II. 
 
In his S 2255 motion, Ramos asserted that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a S 924(c)(1) 
conviction under the Bailey "use" standard. On appeal, 
Ramos further argues that the jury instructions regarding 
this element were erroneous in light of Bailey. We will 
address each of these arguments. 
 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
In contending that the evidence was not sufficient to 
show "use" under Bailey, Ramos specifically argues that 
King did not properly identify Ramos, whose first name is 
Antonio, as the "Tony" whom Ramos saw holding the hand 
gun. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. The government responds, 
first, that a rational jury could have concluded that Ramos 
was the "Tony" to whom King referred and, second, that the 
evidence in any event was sufficient to sustain Ramos's 
S 921(c)(1) conviction under a conspiracy theory of liability. 
Gov't's Br. at 14-17. In considering the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented at trial, the appropriate standard is 
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the government as verdict winner, a jury could have found 
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
1. Guns on the Table as "Use" 
 
The first question to be addressed is whether King's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court concluded that the unusual and "somewhat surreal" 
scene of a drug dealer actually surrendering a weapon to a customer 
does not satisfy the requirement that a defendant refer to, brandish or 
display a gun as a visible but forceful presence. D. Ct.'s Order at 9-10. 
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testimony that guns were lying on a table in the room 
where a drug transaction took place is sufficient to sustain 
a S 924(c)(1) conviction. We conclude that it is. 
 
In Bailey, the Supreme Court held that "use" under 
S 924(c)(1) requires a showing of active employment by the 
defendant. 116 S. Ct. at 505. The Court defined active 
employment as including "brandishing, displaying, 
bartering, striking with, and most obviously, firing or 
attempting to fire, a firearm." Id. at 508. The Court further 
noted that "a reference to a firearm calculated to bring 
about a change in the circumstances of the predicate 
offense is a `use,' just as the silent but obvious and forceful 
presence of a gun on a table can be a `use.' " Id. (emphasis 
added). In contrast, when the Supreme Court discussed the 
"mere presence" of guns, it described the presence of guns 
in a nearby closet for the purpose of providing a sense of 
security and/or emboldening a defendant. Id. at 508. To 
the Court, this latter situation evidenced storage and not 
active employment. Id. 
 
King's testimony is sufficient to meet the requirements of 
"use" as established in Bailey. According to King, the guns 
were placed in plain view on the table while he was in the 
apartment buying drugs. As the Supreme Court explicitly 
stated in Bailey, the "silent but obvious and forceful 
presence of a gun on the table can be a `use.' " 116 S. Ct. 
at 508. If the guns had been out of King's sight (for 
example, under a couch or in a drawer of the table), they 
would merely have been available for the drug sellers. But 
since King testified that the guns were placed in plain view 
on the table, his testimony was sufficient to show"use." 
 
The men's handling of the gun further supports the 
conclusion that the guns were "used." King testified that on 
at least one occasion he witnessed a man holding the 
handgun, and on another occasion a man held a shotgun. 
If, as we believe, the guns could be viewed as "a silent but 
obvious and forceful presence" while lying on the table, they 
could reasonably be viewed as creating an even more 
forceful presence when the men were actively holding them. 
 
2. Ramos's Criminal Liability 
 
The next question is whether the government established 
that Ramos was criminally liable for this use. After viewing 
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 
we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish 
Ramos's guilt under S 924(c)(1). 
 
a. "A Tony" 
 
Ramos's principal argument is that King never identified 
Ramos as the "Tony" whom King saw pick up a gun and, 
indeed, that King never identified Ramos as being present 
in the apartment when King was buying drugs and the 
guns were displayed. We conclude, however, that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the inference that Ramos 
was the "Tony" to whom King referred. Blanco testified that 
he and Ramos sold the drugs from the second-floor 
apartment while Chemono and Pappitto made the 
deliveries. Three other witnesses also identified Ramos as 
one of the men who sold drugs in the second-floor 
apartment and said that his nickname was "Tony." See 
A36, A38, A50 (Blanco); A52-53, A54 (Burgos); A61-62 
(Valentin); A70-71, 74 (Garcia). No other participant in the 
conspiracy went by that name. Viewing this evidence 
together with King's testimony, a reasonable jury could 
infer that Ramos was the "Tony" who was present in the 
apartment selling drugs and holding the gun. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that King's 
testimony was less than clear. King testified in relevant part 
as follows: 
 
       Q. Do you know a man by the name of Roman 
       Antonio Blanco? 
 
       A. Yes, ma'am, I do. 
 
       Q. How do you know him? 
 
       A. From buying drugs? 
 
A.79-80. 
 
       Q: Were there other individuals in that apartment 
       from whom you purchased drugs besides Mr. 
       Blanco? 
 
       A: Yeah, I got drugs from another guy, Roman Blanco. 
 
       Q: Well, Mr. Blanco is Roman Blanco. 
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       A: Okay, well, him and there is a tall fellow I got 
       drugs from. 
 
       Q: Do you recall a name? 
 
       A: I used to call him Meta and they responded to that. 
 
       Q: What's that word mean? 
 
       A: Meta means look in Spanish. 
 
       Q: Did you ever see any weapons when you went to 
       227, or I shouldn't say that, to the apartment on 
       South Queen Street? 
 
       A: Yes, ma'am, I did. 
 
       Q: Can you tell the jury what you saw? 
 
       A: I seen a large caliber silver handgun and I seen a 
       sawed-off shotgun. 
 
       Q: Can you describe what the sawed-off shotgun 
       looked like? 
 
       A: It was about this long and it had a pistol grip to it. 
       (Indicating) It was about like that. 
 
       Q: Are you saying it didn't have a stock? 
 
       A: No ma'am, it didn't have a stock. Yes, that's what 
       I'm saying. It didn't have a stock to it. 
 
       Q: Now who -- was there somebody who had 
       possession of the guns at the time that you saw 
       them or were they just there? 
 
       A: They were just laying on the table. 
 
       Q: Did you ever see anybody in that apartment 
       actually pick up a gun? 
 
       A: Yes, I seen a "Tony" pick up the gun and say like 
       this at one time. And the tall fellow had a shotgun 
       in his hand one time. 
 
       Q: The tall fellow, and he the person that you refer to 
       as Meta? 
 
       A: I refer to all of them as Meta. 
 
       Q: Why did you do that? 
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       A: Because they didn't tell me their names. 
 
A81-83. 
 
Although this testimony obviously provided grist for a 
jury argument, we see nothing in this exchange that 
precluded a rational jury from inferring that the "Tony" 
whom King saw pick up a gun was Ramos. To be sure, it 
is unclear whether King was also referring to Ramos when 
he mentioned "the tall fellow" who sold him drugs or "the 
tall fellow" who held a shot gun in his hands on one 
occasion, but in either event a rational jury could still infer 
that Ramos, whose nickname was "Tony," was the"Tony" 
identified by King as holding a gun. The argument now 
advanced by Ramos's attorney was one for the jury, which 
had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. This 
argument does not provide a ground for S 2255 relief. 
 
b. Pinkerton Liability 
 
In addition, the government's evidence is sufficient to 
sustain Ramos's S 924(c)(1) conviction under a Pinkerton 
theory of liability. A defendant convicted of conspiracy is 
liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts of his co- 
conspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). This court 
has held that a defendant may be found guilty of violating 
S 924(c)(1) under a Pinkerton theory of liability. United 
States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 
118 S. Ct. 221 (1997). 
 
Even if King's testimony were not sufficient to show that 
Ramos himself used or carried a firearm during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking offense, his testimony was 
clearly sufficient to show that one or more of the other 
conspirators did so. Moreover, there was ample evidence to 
show that Ramos was a member of the conspiracy (he was 
convicted of that very crime) and that S 924(c)(1) violation 
was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. King's 
testimony was sufficient to establish that at least one 
member of Ramos' conspiracy used guns in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. Blanco and Ramos rented the second-floor 
apartment so to sell drugs; it was used for that purpose; 
and King testified that he bought drugs from men in the 
second-floor apartment. On at least one occasion when 
 
                                9 
  
King was buying drugs in that apartment, the men selling 
drugs had guns on the table.4 At times, one of them even 
held a gun while King was in the apartment buying the 
drugs. 
 
The use of the guns in furtherance of the conspiracy was 
also reasonably foreseeable. The co-conspirators stored the 
drugs and the guns in the third-floor apartment, and 
Ramos had access to that apartment. A logical inference is 
that he knew that the guns were in the third-floor 
apartment and that he knew that the guns were there for 
possible future use during the process of selling of the 
drugs. Additionally, even if Valentin's testimony was not 
enough to demonstrate "use" under Bailey, it certainly 
shows that Ramos at times had a gun in the second-floor 
apartment while he was selling drugs. If Ramos had a gun 
in the apartment, it would certainly be reasonably 
foreseeable to him that his co-conspirators would have a 
gun in that apartment and that they would have the guns 
on the table or in their hands. 
 
Ramos next argues that because King did not 
affirmatively identify a person holding a gun, none of the 
conspirators could be guilty of violating S924(c)(1). This 
argument is faulty because, in order to establish Pinkerton 
liability, it is not necessary to establish the identity of the 
conspirator who personally committed the substantive 
offense. It is sufficient to show that this individual was a 
co-conspirator, that he or she committed the substantive 
offense, and that he or she did so in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. Here, there was ample evidence to support 
such a finding. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to 
support Ramos's S 924(c)(1) under a Pinkerton theory of 
liability. 
 
B. Jury Instructions 
 
Ramos's remaining argument on appeal is that the "use" 
instruction given to the jury at trial was erroneous in light 
of Bailey. However, Ramos made no reference to the jury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. King's description of the guns (a large silver handgun and sawed-off 
shotgun) matches the description of two of the guns stored in the third 
floor apartment with the drugs. 
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instructions in his S 2255 motion before the district court, 
and the district court understandably did not interpret his 
motion as raising a question regarding the instructions. 
Under these circumstances, we are hesitant to consider the 
issue on appeal. See United States v. Shovlin, 464 F.2d 
1211 (3d Cir. 1972) (refusing to consider two additional 
grounds for habeas relief that were not raised before the 
district court or briefed before this court). Moreover, even if 
we were to read Ramos's pro se S 2255 motion as raising 
the issue, he still would not be entitled to relief in light of 
the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. 
Bousley, 1998 WL 244204 (May 18, 1998). Because he did 
not raise the jury instruction issue on direct appeal, he 
procedurally defaulted on this issue, and under Bousley it 
is apparent that Ramos cannot demonstrate either "cause" 
for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal or "actual 
innocence." Bousley held that a S 2255 movant cannot 
show "cause" for failing to make a Bailey argument on 
direct appeal by demonstrating that circuit law at the time 
would have made any such argument futile. Furthermore, 
Bousley concluded that, in order for a S 2255 movant to 
show actual innocence, the movant must show "factual 
innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Id. at * 5. Here, 
where the evidence was sufficient to support the S 924(c)(1) 
conviction, that standard obviously could not be met. 
 
III. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the district court's order 
denying Ramos's motion under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
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